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1. Introduction*
During the post-war decades goods, services, labor and capital have gradually become more mobile
across nations. This process of increased international mobility may have improved the allocation of
resources and given substantial gains from trade. To reinforce this line of development in Europe the
European Union (EU) has introduced the so-called four liberties which means that goods, services,
labor and capital are now allowed to move freely across the EU borders. These four liberties can now
be enjoyed not only by citizens and firms within EU, but also by countries that are members of the
European-Economic-Area.
Increased mobility of goods, services, labor and capital creates a new climate of competition
which makes it costly to maintain tax systems that differ substantially across nations. The more mobile
the tax base turns out to be, the more costly it is to implement higher national tax rates than in other
countries. We refer to Musgrave (1969) for an early discussion of these issues.
Labor has normally been considered to be the least mobile factor, at least when judged on the
basis of European data. The dismantling of country-specific barriers may increase the mobility in
European labor markets. Cultural differences and language problems may, on the other hand, have a
substantial negative effect on mobility. Yet, the removal of mobility costs and the fact that (some) high
skilled workers and professionals are rather mobile, may in the long run prevent European nations
from allowing for significant differences in the taxation of labor income. Thus, tax system competition
may arise as a result of EU's introduction of the four liberties
Since progressive tax systems normally tax the income of skilled workers and professionals
more heavily than the income of the lesser skilled, tax system competition will most likely move the
tax systems towards a proportional (European) tax structure; see Sinn (1995) for a theoretical
discussion where the tax competition equilibrium implies zero tax rates. However, by relaxing the
extreme mobility costs assumptions of Sinn (1995), a tax competition equilibrium with a positive
proportional tax rate may be plausible.
Capital is conventionally considered to be a mobile factor, and the introduction of EU's four
liberties has removed the last barriers against free capital movements throughout Western Europe. This
fact has made the taxation of capital and firm income approximately proportional and quite similar in
European countries. There are three major reasons why the mobility-induced proportional capital and
firm income taxation may change the progressive taxation of labor income towards a proportional tax
system. Firstly, progressive labor income taxes may be perceived unfair by a voting majority of wage
earners when firms face proportional taxes. Second, if capital and firm income are taxed differently
from labor income, this may give incentives to black market and/or tax evasion activities. To handle
this type of economic crime problems government authorities may find it appropriate to change
* Paper presented at the Tutzing Conference, October 1995, on "Competition or Harmonization".
taxation towards proportional taxes. Finally, as suggested by Gordon and Nielsen (1995), when labor
income is taxed at a progressive rate but firm income is taxed at an uniform (proportional) rate, the
progressive labor income tax may cause an efficiency cost. To avoid this cost governments have to
change the tax system where it can be changed. Thus, there are good reasons to expect that taxation of
labor income in Europe — with no formal coordination of tax systems at the European level —
gradually will be changed towards a proportional tax system. If so, one may ask what would be the
effects on distributions of income and welfare of this change in tax structures.
The Scandinavian countries have gradually developed the welfare state institutions during this
century. An important element in this development was the construction of institutions for
redistributing income through progressive taxation, social benefits and transfers, wage policy, public
education and public health care. The economic implications of these welfare state institutions have
been questioned recently, primarily due to substantial efficiency losses. In particular, it has been
pointed to the negative impact on overall economic efficiency from having progressive income taxes.
Apart from anecdotal evidences and studies based on aggregated data there are, however, few
empirical welfare analyses that take into account the heterogeneity among households and firms and
thus the impact on the distribution of individual welfare of changes in the structure, see Atkinson
(1995).
The objective of this paper is to examine the welfare effects from replacing current tax systems
by a proportional labor income tax. To broaden the relevance of our study we compare Italy, which
has a low degree of progression in the taxation of labor income by Scandinavian standards, with
Norway and Sweden. Based on microeconometric labor supply models, we have simulated labor
supply responses and welfare gains and losses for married couples from replacing the country-specific
1992-tax systems by proportional taxation. The tax rates are chosen so as to keep the tax revenues
fixed and equal to the country-specific 1992-revenues. The simulation results show that the
proportional tax rates vary between 25 and 29 per cent which appear to be close to the current tax rates
on capital income. The mean welfare effect from introducing proportional taxation is found to be
positive which suggest that there are efficiency costs associated with the current progressive labor
income taxes. However, the results reveal large variation in the distribution of welfare gains/losses.
Rich households — defined by their pre-tax-reform income — tend to benefit more than the poor.
Moreover, the losers tend to have lower pre-tax-reform incomes than the winners.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a description of our policy evaluation
methodology which is based on a particular framework of modelling labor supply. The modelling
approach differs from conventional empirical models of labor supply in several respects. Firstly, it is
designed to account for observed as well as unobserved heterogeneity in tastes and choice constraints,
which means that it is able to take into account the presence of quantity constraints in the market.
Second, it is well suited for dealing with joint labor supply decisions of married couples, and complex
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non-convex budget sets. The empirical specifications of the model and the estimation results, based on
Italian, Norwegian and Swedish tax return data for married couples, are given in Appendix 1. Section
3 reports the policy simulation results, and Section 4 summarizes our findings.
2. Methodological issues
Our policy evaluation methodology relies on a particular framework for modelling labor supply
behavior, developed in Dagsvik (1994) and employed by Aaberge et al. (1995). This modelling
approach differs from the conventional empirical models of labor supply, in which labor supply is
derived from utility maximization with consumption and leisure as the only choice variables of the
household. By contrast, our framework acknowledges the importance of location of the workplace and
social environment and working conditions for the choice of job by modelling labor supply behavior
as a discrete choice problem, where the alternatives are "job-packages". These job-packages are
characterized by specific attributes such as wage rates, hours of work and other non-pecuniary
variables. In addition, this framework is able to take into account that there are important quantity
constraints in the market, in the sense that different types of jobs are not equally available to every
agent. Agents differ by qualifications, and jobs differ with respect to qualifications required.
Labor supply models are helpful devices for examining individual welfare effects from tax
reforms. The welfare effects are measured by various Hicks-compensating measures, see Auerbach
(1985), Hausman (1981) and King (1987) for a discussion of alternative money metrics of welfare
change, and Hammond (1990) for arguments in favor of using Equivalent Variation (EV). Loosely
speaking, EV is measured as the amount of money that has to be added to/subtracted from the
household's disposable income under the initial tax rules in order to make the household indifferent
between the intial and the alternative tax system. Note that EV is measured at the household level. EV
sums up the household's net welfare gain/loss associated with behavioral responses induced by tax
reforms, say, increased consumption and reduced leisure.
An empirical micro-model — such as the one we apply here — is designed to account for
observed as well as unobserved heterogeneity. Unobserved heterogeneity arises from the fact that as
econometricians we are unable to observe all factors that affect individual tastes and opportunities.
These unobservables are modelled as random variables, which imply that a money metric of welfare
change, such as EV, at the household level becomes a random variable; see King (1987) and Atkinson
(1990). In other words, micro-econometric models (which accounts for observed and unobserved
heterogeneity in tastes and choice constraints) allow the analyst to study the distribution of EV. Like
Hammond (1990) we are skeptical as to introducing a social welfare function. The reason is that a
specific social welfare function relies on an arbitrarily chosen cardinalization of the utility function. As
an alternative, we present the frequency distribution of EV conditional on the pre-tax-reform income
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of the households. The mean of this distribution is the overall mean welfare gain/loss which indeed can
be interpreted as being derived from an utilitarian social welfare function. Note that conventional
empirical analyses of tax reforms solely report the mean EV, see e.g. Hausman (1985), Hausman and
Poterba (1987) and Blomquist (1983), whilst the present approach allows for an evaluation that
identifies both losers and winners.
2.1. A brief outline of the labor supply model
Each agent faces a different set of non-market and market opportunities (jobs). Let B (h, w), denote
the set of jobs with hours h > 0, and wage rate w > 0, that are feasible to agent i. B (0,0) is the set of
non-market opportunities. Let Ui (C, h, j) denote the utility for agent i of consumption C, hours h and
opportunity j, where j e Bi (h, w), h 0, w O. The argument of the utility function accounts for the
fact that the agent's preferences may vary across job types.
The economic budget constraint is given by
C = f (wh, I) , 	 (1)
where / is non-labor income and f is a function that transforms gross income into after-tax income. The
price index of the composite good (called consumption) is equal to one. When inserting the budget
constraint into the utility function we get U	 (wh, I), h, j).
We will assume that
	U (f (wh, I), h, j) = v (f (wh, I), h) E (h, w) 	(2)
where v(C, h) is a positive, deterministic function which is quasi-concave in (C, h) , increasing in the
first argument and decreasing in the second. The term E (h, w) is a random taste-shifter that is
supposed to capture the effect of unobservable attributes associated with opportunity j. Note that this
term is viewed as random from the econometrician's point of view, while it is assumed known to the
agent. Specifically, lc (h, w)} accounts for the fact that for a given agent, tastes may vary over
opportunities, hours and wages, and for a given opportunity, tastes may vary across agents. Finally,
define
	(h, w) = max j eBi(h,w) i (f (wh, I), h, j).	 (3)
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Vi (h, w) is the conditional indirect utility function, given hours of work and the wage rate. In other
words, for agent i, Vi (h, w) is the utility of the most preferred opportunity among the feasible
opportunities with hours h and wage rate w.
From (2) and (3) we get
where
and
Vi(h,w) =v(h,w)e i (h,w)	 (4)
e i (h,w) = max Bi(kw)
 E 1  (h, w)	 (5)
tif (h, w) = v (f(wh, I), h).	 (6)
Recall that hours and wage rates are fixed for each job so that when a job has been chosen,
then hours and wage rate follow. The individual agent is assumed to choose the job that maximizes
utility. The corresponding hours and wage rate, (h, w), therefore follow from maximizing Vi (h, w).
In order to derive the structure of the choice probabilities of realized hours and wage rates we
have to make further assumptions about the distribution of the random components in this model.
These probabilities enter the likelihood function which is used when estimating the unknown
parameters of the model. In our setting we assume that in addition to the taste shifters the opportunity
sets are also random to the econometrician.
	
Let n i (h, w) be the number of jobs in B (h, w) and let	 w) be the mean of
ni(h,w) 
EE ni (x,y)+n i (0,0)
x>0 y>0
across agents. Assume that the taste-shifters are i.i.d. with distribution
	P (e i; (14 ) )7) = ex+
	
(7)
In Dagsvik (1994) it is demonstrated that equation (7) follows from the assumption that agents have
preferences over job-types that satisfy the "independence from irrelevant alternatives" property. The
taste-shifters are assumed to be stochastically independent of the choice sets {A (h, w)}. For
expository reasons we suppress the fact that parameters of the opportunity sets and preferences also
depend on observed covariates.
go =	 j(0,0)
x>0 y>0
Let 9(h, w) be the probability that agent i shall choose a job with hours and wage rate (h,
If the mean of	 ni ( x, y) is large, it can be shown that the assumptions introduced above imply
x, y
that
'tí (h,
	
(h, w) (p(h, w) P[Vi (h, w)= max Vi ( x, y)]
x,y	 (o,o)k-(o,o)+IIiv ( x, y)š,
x>0 y>0
for h > 0, w > 0 . For the sake of interpretation it is convenient to express (8) as
v(h,w) go g(h,w)9(h, w) =
ly (0,0) + go	(x,y) g( x, y)
x>0 y>0
y)
(8)
(9)
where
for h> 0, w > 0, and
The probability of not working equals
g(h,w)=	 (h, w) 
1(x, y)
x>0 y>0
(10)
(12)v (0,0) go9(0,0) = (0,0) + go IIv(x,y) g(x,y) •
x>0 y>0
The function g(h, w) is denoted the conditional opportunity density of hours and wage rates, and it can
be interpreted as the mean of the fraction of feasible jobs with hours h and wage rate w. Similarly, go
is the mean of the fraction of opportunities that are feasible job-opportunities. Note that the
opportunity density, g( ,.) may depend on the production technology of the firms as well as of the
wage setting policies of the firms and the unions.
The functional form of (9) and (12) is particularly attractive. The labor supply density 9(h, w)
is expressed as a simple function of the structural term of the utility function, vO, and of gog(),
which is an aggregate representation of the set of feasible job opportunities.
The extension of the model to deal with the joint decisions of husband and wife is analogous
to the case of single person households. Then the household is assumed to have preferences over
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consumption and leisure for the husband and wife. For further details we refer to Dagsvik and StrOm
(1995) and Aaberge et al. (1995). Empirical specifications and estimation results are reported in
Appendix 1.
The estimated models are used to simulate the changes in individual behavior resulting from
changes in the 1992 tax systems in Italy, Norway and Sweden. The objective of the simulation
experiments is to evaluate labor supply responses, distribution of income and welfare gains and losses
caused by replacing the country-specific tax system as of 1992 by proportional taxation. Welfare gains
and losses are measured by Equivalent Variation (EV). To describe the method of calculation it
appears convenient to introduce the following notation. Let
f) r maxmax (U i (EV + f (hw, I), h, .0).
h,w jelli (h,w)
Note that (EV, f) is the indirect utility for agent i under tax regime , when the agent is
endowed with non-taxable non-labor income EV.
We define equivalent variations for the agent as the amount EV determined by
(Ev, b
 )= (0, fi )
where the subscript O denotes the initial (reference) tax regime, and subscript 1 the alternative tax
regime. Since the utility function is - random so is also EV. The various parameters describing the
distribution of EV are assessed by means of stochastic simulations.
3. Results of tax simulations
The multi-person version of the model outlined in the preceding section is employed to simulate labor
supply responses and individual welfare effects from introducing proportional taxes. The tax reform
simulations are performed in a partial equilibrium setting, as in Browning (1987). In our framework,
this means that the distribution of offered wages and hours are considered as exogenously given and
thus unaffected by a change of tax systems., i.e. the opportunity densities ( go and g ) in (9) and (12)
are kept fixed. The total number of jobs are assumed to increase (decrease) with increasing
(decreasing) labor supply.
For all three countries the estimated microeconometric models are applied for simulating
distributions of labor supply and income in the reference year 1992. In the simulations the tax revenue
for the reference year is kept constant and the model is used to assess the proportional tax rate.
The results of Tables 1-3 demonstrate that the labor supply responses from replacing the 1992-
tax-regime ("current tax regime") by a proportional tax are rather strong in Norway, in particular for
females. Moreover, labor supply responses decrease with increasing pre-tax-reform household income.
(13)
(14)
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Annual hours of work Households, 1000 ITL
"Poor" households experience reduced marginal tax rates and increased average tax rate. Thus, the
substitution as well as the income effect predict higher labor supply. For the "rich" households both
the marginal and the average tax rates decrease. Consequently, the substitution and income effects for
"rich" households have different signs and thus have counteracting impacts on labor supply. Note,
however, that the "poor" households are observed to work shorter hours than the "rich" under the
1992-tax-regime.
As an implication of these labor supply responses gross as well as disposable income increase
for almost all households in all three countries. The increase in income for the "poorest" households in
Norway is rather strong and follows from the strong labor supply responses. Note that the total tax
revenues are kept constant at the 1992 national levels.
Table 4 reports the Gini coefficients of gross and disposable household income. The results for
Norway demonstrate that even inequality in the distribution of disposable income decreases
substantially, which mainly is due to the strong labor supply responses among "poor" households. By
contrast, for Sweden we find that the inequality in the distribution of disposable income increases. For
Italy we find only minor changes in income inequality.
Table 1. Participation rates, annual hours of work, gross income, disposable income and taxes for
married couples under alternative tax regimes by disposable household income in 1992. Italy
1992
Participation	 Given	 In the total	 Gross	 Taxes	 Dis-
rates
	 participation	 population	 income	 posable
per cent	 income
F
I	 4.3	 97.0	 1529	 1832	 66	 1777	 19756	 3656	 16100
II	 38.5	 96.3	 1691	 2036	 651	 1961	 44877	 10845	 34032
III	 70.0	 94.4	 1809 2053 1265 1939	 90452	 21047	 69405 
1V- -iiTi- 96.2
	r— ioTT — –6-571 - 1940	 46920	 11146	 35774 
I	 4.3	 97.5	 1398	 1855	 62	 1809	 20394	 4882	 15512
Proportional	 II	 36.5	 96.2	 1712 2058
	 625	 1981	 45717	 10931	 34786
taxes ')	 III	 67.4	 94.6	 1819	 2091	 1225	 1979	 91544	 19132	 72411 
1V --- 36.4 --- -9-6-1—
 177--29 --- 2041- — –Of — -1963--  ."	 47765	 11146	 36619
1992-
tax rules
F
1) The proportional tax rate of 23.3 per cent is determined by model simulation when the tax revenue is held
fixed equal to the 1992 tax revenue.
Note that	 I = 10 per cent poorest households
II = 80 per cent in the middle of the distribution of households' disposable income
ifi = 10 per cent richest households
IV = all households
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Annual hours of work Households, NOK 1992 
Dis-
posable
income
TaxesGross
income
Participation
rates
r cent
In the total
population
Given
participation
F
I	 41.5	 74.1	 926	 1833	 386	 1360
II	 77.3	 98.4	 1494 2432	 1154 2394
III 96.4	 99.9 2279 2846 2198 2846
—IV— 75.4	 96.0 1562 2427 1178 2331	 383495	 119437	 264058 
I	 73.2	 96.2	 1756 2660
	 1286 2557	 413326	 102137	 311189
Proportional	 II	 80.6	 99.5	 1761 2743	 1419 2729	 471282	 116107	 355175
taxes»	 III	 95.8	 99.9	 2311 2906 2213 2902	 672104	 163658	 508446 
IV— 81.4	 99.2 1825 2751 1485 2730	 485481	 119445	 366036
1) The proportional tax rate of 25.4 per cent is determined by model simulation when the tax revenue is held
fixed equal to the 1992 tax revenue.
Note that	 I = 10 per cent poorest households
II = 80 per cent in the middle of the distribution of households' disposable income
ifi = 10 per cent richest households
IV = all households
Table 3. Annual hours of work, gross income, disposable income and taxes for married couples under
alternative tax regimes. Sweden
1992-
tax rules
Annual hours of work,
given participation
Households, SEK 1992
Gross	 Taxes	 Disposable
income	 income
221 966	 55 757	 166 209
382 603	 110 792	 271 811
706 351	 245 257	 461 094 
401 227	 119 838	 281 389
232 468	 67 835	 164 632
399 407	 115 211	 284 195
741 690	 208 837	 532 853 
416 952
	
119 839
	
297 113
F	 M
I	 1 147	 1 903
1992-	 II	 1 690	 2 117
tax rules	 III	 1 847	 2 339
160158
372208
650958
36454
115816
235295
123705
256392
415662
IV	 1 656	 2 126
1 188	 1 977
Proportional	 II	 1 721	 2 209
taxes»	 1 874	 2 464
IV	 1 683	 2 211
Table 2. Participation rates, annual hours of work, gross income, disposable income and taxes for
married couples under alternative tax regimes by disposable household income in 1992. Norway
1) The proportional tax rate of 29.5 per cent is determined by model simulation when the tax revenue is held
fixed equal to the 1992 tax revenue.
Note that	 I = 10 per cent poorest households
II = 80 per cent in the middle of the distribution of households' disposable income
ifi = 10 per cent richest households
IV = all households
1 1
Table 4. Gini coefficients of distributions of gross and disposable income for couples in Italy, Norway
and Sweden
Tax system	 Nation	 Gross income	 Disposable
income
1992 tax rules	 Italy	 .243	 .234
Norway	 .205	 .177
Sweden	 .192	 .164
Proportional taxation	 Italy	 .238	 .238
Norway	 .165	 .165
Sweden	 .202	 .202
The mean EV in all three countries is positive which suggests that there are efficiency costs
related to the 1992 tax regimes compared to proportional taxation. Tables 5-7 report the mean EV
relative to the tax revenue and show that this welfare measure of the cost of taxation varies from 1.5
per cent for Italy, 4.8 per cent for Sweden, to as much as 34.2 per cent for Norway. The predicted high
mean welfare gain in Norway is primarily due to the strong female labor supply responses.
King (1987) argues that a small mean welfare gain may shadow for a large variation in gains
and losses across households. Thus, King stresses the importance of accounting for heterogeneity
when making welfare assessments of tax reforms. Hammond (1990) puts forward the same warnings.
Our results confirm the relevance of these warnings. Although only one per cent of the population lose
from the considered tax reform in Norway, between 55 and 60 per cent lose in Italy and Sweden. In
Italy the mean welfare loss among the losers is 1 029 000 ITL, while the mean gain among the winners
is 1 890 000 ITL. In Sweden the mean loss among the losers is 8 252 SEK, while the mean gain
among the winners is approximately three times higher. For further details see Tables 1-7.
Table 5. Distribution of equivalent variation by household income' ) under 1992-taxes. Italy
Equivalent variations, 1000 Ins 1992
Total
	Mean	 EV
relative to
average tax
Per cent
	
165	 4.5
II	 120	 1.1
III	 517	 2.5
Losers
	P r cent Mean	 EV
of popu-	 relative to
lation	 average tax
Per cent
58.5	 -1032	 -28.0
60.1	 -1030	 -9.6
51.8	 -1008	 -4.8
Winners 
Per cent	 Mean	 EV
of popu-	 relative to
lation
	
average tax
Per cent
	
41.5	 1860	 51.8
	
39.9	 1855	 16.7
	
48.2	 2157	 10.3
IV	 164	 1.5 59.1	 -1029	 -9.4 40.9	 1890	 16.5
1) Note that I = 10 per cent poorest households
II = 80 per cent in the middle of the distribution of households' disposable income
III = 10 per cent richest households
IV = all households
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21799
II	 38199
III	 80811
IV	 40804
EV
relative to
average tax
Per cent
59.8
33.0
34.3
34.2
Losers
Per cent Mean
of popu-
lation
	
8.6	 -3694
	
0.3	 -1301
0.0
EV
relative to
average tax
Per cent
-11.8
-2.2
Winners
Per cent	 Mean
of popu-
lation
	
91.4	 24132
	
99.7	 38288
	
100.0	 80811
	
99.0	 41258
EV
relative to
average tax
Per cent
65.1
33.0
34.3
34.2
Total
Mean
1.0	 -3425	 -9.9
Losers
EV
relative to
average tax
Per cent
	-9420	 -17.5
	
-8350	 -9.6
	
-7642 	 -7.2 
	
-8525	 -10.5
Winners
Per cent Mean
of popu-
lation
4.8	 10503
41.6	 16433
96.4	  52139
43.4	 24291IV	 5722	 4.8
EV
relative to
average tax
Per cent
-15.2
1.8
20.4
95.2
58.4
3.6 
56.6
Per cent
	 Mean
of popu-
lation
EV
relative to
average tax
Per cent 
13.0
11.3
20.3 
14.3
Total
Mean
-8451
II	 1960
III	 49962
Table 6. Distribution of equivalent variation by household income under 1992-taxes. Norway
Equivalent variations, NOK 1992
1) Note that I = 10 per cent poorest households
11 = 80 per cent in the middle of the distribution of households' disposable income
III = 10 per cent richest households
P/= all households
Table 7. Distribution of equivalent variation by household income" under 1992-taxes. Sweden
Equivalent variations, SEK 1992
1) Note that I	 10 per cent poorest households
11 = 80 per cent in the middle of the distribution of households' disposable income
ffl = 10 per cent richest households
IV= all households
4. Conclusions
Tax system competition may change the current progressive tax systems in Europe towards a
proportional tax on taxable income. This process may lead to proportional tax rates that differ slightly
(25-30 per cent) to account for initial differences in tax revenues across nations. This specific change
in tax structure may reduce the efficiency loss caused by progressive tax rates on labor income.
Our study demonstrates that the welfare effects from introducing proportional taxes vary
largely depending on how responsive labor supply shows to be. Based on three empirical
microeconornetric labor supply models we find that the labor supply responses are high in Norway and
modest in Italy and Sweden. The weak labor supply responses for Italy are primarily due to the fact
that the 1992 tax system did not differ significantly from a proportional tax system, whilst the low
responses in Sweden may be due to stricter regulations of working hours which are accounted for in
the model.
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The transition from progressive to proportional taxation reinforces the efficiency gains from a
freer trade in Europe caused by the dismantling of borders. Then one may ask whether the reduction in
loss of efficiency is attained at the cost of increased income and welfare inequality. Our results,
however, do not indicate any sharp increase in income inequality. On the contrary, in the case of
Norway we find that the inequality in the distribution of gross household income is reduced to an
extent that even makes the distribution of after-tax household income more equal. However, when the
value of leisure is taken into account, we find that the welfare of rich households — in particular in
Norway — increases far more than the welfare of poor households.
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Appendix 1. Empirical specifications and estimation results
Norway
Let the subscript F and M denote female and male, respectively. In the case of married couples the
structural part of the utility function defined by (6) is
4 (10 -4 Cr — (g;log v(C, h	 aF, hm )=
al	
+ a
3 
—1(
a 4 + logA m + a 6 (log Am )2 )
/
+ 
Lai 1
 - 1)/
a 7 ka8+a9 iogAF+ccio(logAF) +l
‘2
a CU6 +a 1 CO6) + a 13 LF Lm
(15)
where AF, Am are the age of the wife and the husband, respectively, CU6 and C06 are number of children
less than 6 and above 6 years, LK is leisure for gender k = M, F , defmed as
LK = hK /8760,	 (16)
and a j , j =1,2, ... ,13 , are unknown parameters.
If a l <1,a 3 <1,a 7 <1,0C 2 >0,
a -4 + 0C 5 logAm +a 6 (1og Am
a 8 +0C 9 logAF +a m (log A)2 +a 11 CU6+a 1 C06>0
then log v(C, hF , hm ) is increasing in C, decreasing in (hF , hm ) and strictly concave in (C,hF ,hm ).
It is assumed that the offered hours is not correlated with offered wage rates, which may be
justified by the fact that in most countries working hours are regulated by law or set in central negotiations
between unions and employers associations. The fraction of jobs with a given number of horns is assumed
to be consistent with a uniform distribution of hours apart from a peak at full-time hours for males and
part-time hours for females. The fraction of jobs with a given wage rate is assumed to be a log normal
density with gender-specific means that depend on length of schooling and on experience. "Experience" is
defmed as age minus length of schooling minus six.
The results from estimating the model on Norwegian data from 1986 are given in Table 8.
Note that the most parameters are rather precisely determined and have the theoretically
expected signs.
The estimates are in accordance with the theory in the sense the mean utility function is an
increasing and strictly concave function in consumption and leisure. The males marginal mean utility
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of leisure in Norway attains a minimum at the age of 41.9 years and in the case of females, at the age
of 35 years. The wife's education turns out to affect the fraction of feasible job opportunities such that
a higher educated woman has more job opportunities than a less educated one. (Implied by â 15 < O.)
For the estimate of the wage opportunity density we refer to Aaberge et al. (1995) who also
report various aggregate labor supply elasticities.
Table 8. Estimates*) of the parameters of the utility function and of the opportunity density. Norway 1986
Variables	 Coefficient	 Estimates	 t-values
Preferences: 
Consumption
Male leisure
Female leisure
Leisure interaction term
Opportunities:
Female opportunity measure
Male opportunity measure
Interaction
Full-time peak, males
Full-time peak, females
Part-time peak, females
	0.951	 16.4
a2	 1.269
	
5.6
a3 	 -4.312
	 6.8
a4
	 100.598
	 3.0
a5 	 -53.091
	 3.0
a6
	 7.270
	 3.0
-2.240	 5.5
as
	 237.438
	 3.9
a9	 -130.174
	 3.9
	
18.492	 4.1
	
3.397
	 6.4
	
1.648	 4.8
0
a14
	 0.063	 0.1
als	 -0.203
	 3.7
a16 	 -3.296
	 4.5
	
1.289
	
4.5
als
	 1.062	 11.2
a19
	 0.710
	 5.8
a20
	 0.425	 2.5
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Sweden
The structura part of the utility function is defined by 
(10-5 C - 0.3)a -
a l 
log v(C, hF , hm )= a 2 -1-(g; -1 ) (a 4 log An a (log Am 
+
1)
F 	(a8 +a 9 log AF
a7
	+  10 
(l
081 AF )2 +a n CU6+a 12 C 6)	 (17)
-Fai3 LOF3a3 L04.15a7
The fraction of jobs with a given number of hours is assumed to be consistent with a uniform
distribution of hours apart from a peak at full-time hours for males and peaks at full-time, 2/3 part-time
and part-time hours for females. The reason why there are more peaks in the Swedish female case than
in the corresponding Norwegian case is that there are more strict regulation of part-time working hours
in the Swedish labor market than in the Norwegian.
The Swedish dataset does not allow for the modeling of participation and is thus based on
observations for married couples who are working. On the other hand the labor force rates both for
males and females are very high in Sweden (highest in the world).
In Table 9 we present the estimates of the Swedish utility function based on household data
from 1981.
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Table 9. Estimates of the parameters of the utility function and of the opportunity density, Sweden
1981
Variables
	 Coefficient	 Estimates	 t-values
Preferences: 
Consumption	 ai	 0.574	 9.4
a2	 9.278	 11.4
Male leisure	 a3	 -4.607	 5.8
a4	 174.644	 3.0
a5 	-91.188	 3.0
a6	 12.371	 3.1
Female leisure	 a7	 -4.106	 6.5
as	 153.041	 2.5
a9	 -78.834	 2.4
alo
	
10.876	 2.5
all
	
1.541	 3.8
a12	 0.805	 3.1
Leisure interaction term	 a13	 1.698	 1.5
Opportunities:
Full-time peak, males
	0Cl4
	
3.424	 47.1
Full-time peak, females	 (xis
	
2.814	 29.1
2/3 part-time peak, females 	 a16	 1.454	 13.5
Part-time peak, females 	 a17	 1.830	 18.8
Note that most parameters are rather precisely determined (apart from the cross leisure term)
and they have the theoretically expected signs.
The estimates imply that the mean utility function is an increasing and strictly concave function in
consumption and leisure. The males marginal mean utility of leisure attains a minimum at the age of 41.9
years and in the case of females, at the age of 35 years, exactly the same as for Norway.
The estimated wage opportunity density and aggregate labor supply elasticities are reported in
Aaberge et al. (1990).
Italy
The functional form of the deterministic part of the utility function is defined by
log v(C, hF , hm )=[oc 2 (.1 - 11,1 )(1 - F )+ a 3 K F +a 4 Km ea ic
+a 7 logAm +a 8 (logA )1(  mLa5 — 1
+ [a 10 +a I] log A F Alog AF )2 +a CU6 +a CO6 
(18)
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Ki =1 if spouse j is working, otherwise K. =0, and the specification implies that the marginal utility of
consumption differs with respect to the reported labor market participation. The reason for doing this is the
possible existence of non-reported income. The underground economy in Italy is believed to be of some
importance. To capture some of these effects on income and hence on consumption, the marginal utility of
consumption is specified as (implicitly) shown above.
Since the regional variation of wages is more important than in the Scandinavian countries, and
since unemployment in Italy has been rather high by Norwegian/Swedish standards, we will include a
discussion of the estimation of the wage opportunity density here. The opportunity measure for wages are
specified as follows,
log W
.;
 ( z) = 0; +f3 1 s.; 	 + f3 2 Exp j + [3 j (Exp j ) + 4j Regi +11 j(z)	 (19)
j = F, M , where (r) F (Z),
 11M (z)) are normally distributed, s. denotes years of schooling, gender j, Expi =
experience A j — si — 6 and Re g = 1 living in Northern Regions (North of Tuscany) and 0 otherwise.
Moreover,
log(g0 1 )=a 15 +0C 16 Rege 	UE ,	 (20)
and
log(g10 )a 18 +0(. 19 Regs a2oUEm	 (21)
where UE'i is the ratio between the number of unemployed and employed for gender j.
It should be noted that the specifications (20) and (21) imply the following interpretation of the
model parameters. If ai6 and oc19 are positive, then living in Northern Italy improves the chances of finding
a market opportunity, compared to living in Central and Southern Italy. Likewise, negative values of a17
and or,20 indicate that unemployment has a negative impact on job opportunities.
Feasible hours in the market is assumed to be uniformly distributed except for peaks at full-time
hours for females and males, which are defined by the interval [1846, 2106]. Note that this interval
corresponds to weekly hours between 36 and 40.
The estimation results are reported in Table 10.
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Table 10. Estimates of the parameters of the utility function and of the opportunity density, Italy 1987
Variables
	 Coefficient	 Estimates	 t-values
Consumption	 -0.780 • 104 	 -7.7
a2	 -15.938	 -8.3
a3 	-10.020	 -19.1
a4	 -15.364	 -11.4
Male leisure	 a5 	-18.651	 -16.4
a6	 -0.180	 -1.4
a7 	0.102	 1.5
as	 -0.015	 -1.4
Female leisure	 a9	 -6.805
	
-8.1
	
34.428	 2.2
an
	
-19.039	 -2.2
	
2.716	 2.3
	
0.225	 1.8
	
0.275	 2.7
Female opportunity density	 als	 -0.952
	
-2.8
	
0.705
	 6.5
an 	-0.594	 -0.9
Male opportunity density	 -0.512	 -8.4
a19
	 0.310
	 1.2
a20
	 0.243	 0.1
Full-time peak, males	 a21
	 2.406	 28.0
Full-time peak, females 	 a22	 2.501	 51.9
The estimates imply that the deterministic part of the utility function is an increasing and strictly
concave function of leisure and consumption. The basic parameters of the utility function are al , a5 and a9.
These parameters are measured with good precision. The marginal utility of consumption and leisure
depends also on personal characteristics such as age and number of children. The estimates for the
coefficients of these variables are less precise. Children have the expected positive effect on the value of
wife's leisure. However, a rather surprising result is that the presence of older children have essentially the
same effect as younger ones; as a matter of fact the point estimate for the former ones is even larger (this
result, however, accords with other analyses of Italian data, see e.g. Colombino and Del Boca (1990)). A
possible explanation might be found in a cohort effect. Women with older children on average belong to
older cohorts. For a variety of unobserved factors (attitudes, supply of child-care services, etc.) which
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change from one cohort to the other, older cohorts presumably tend to use a more "leisure-intensive"
technology in child-care.
The estimated parameters of the job-opportunities density confirm — at least for females — a more
favourable environment in Northern regions. On the other hand, the effect of =employment is not
measured precisely enough to draw any clear conclusion. For a more comprehensive discussion of the
empirical results we refer to Aaberge et al. (1993) who also report the estimated wage opportunity density
and various aggregate labor supply elasticities.
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